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In April 2011, Lindsay Kamakahi caused an international stir by suing the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), all
SART-member fertility clinics, and all egg agencies that agreed to abide by the ASRM-SART
egg donor compensation guidelines on behalf of herself and other oocyte donors [1]. The suit
challenged the ASRM-SART oocyte donor compensation guidelines, which limit payments to
egg donors to $5,000 ($10,000 under special circumstances), as an illegal price-fixing agreement
in violation of United States antitrust laws. These laws prohibit business practices that
unreasonably restrict competition and result in higher consumer prices for products and services.
In March 2013, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case, thus paving the way
for the litigation to proceed [2].

Kamakahi’s suit, despite the hoopla accompanying it, is in many ways unexceptional, alleging a
fairly straightforward violation of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against contracts, conspiracies,
and combinations in restraint of trade [3]. But oocytes are hardly the common stuff of Sherman
Act claims, and the application of federal antitrust law in such a new and unusual setting was
bound to draw substantial attention [4].

Ensuing discussion of the case has touched on familiar debates surrounding coercion,
commodification, and exploitation. It has also revealed many misconceptions about oocyte
donation, the allegations in the case, and antitrust law’s application to the ASRM-SART oocyte
donor compensation guidelines, some of which I aim to dispel in this article. For example,
ASRM and others have defended the guidelines as a means to ensure low-cost fertility services
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for their patients, a contention that, as I will later explain, is flatly at odds with basic economic
theory and evidence. Others, including ASRM representatives, have derided the suit as frivolous,
an allegation that should be put to rest by the court’s recent denial of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss [5]. Although the case is still in the early stages and the outcome remains to be seen, the
complaint is far from frivolous.

The ASRM Guidelines
ASRM and SART have taken the position since at least 1994 that “reasonable” compensation to
gamete donors is ethically permissible. It was not until 2000, however, in the wake of increasing
public attention to rising rates of egg-donor compensation, that ASRM specifically defined
“reasonable” and began formal efforts to cap egg-donor compensation [6].

A 2000 report of the ASRM Ethics Committee on financial incentives for egg donors stated that
“payments to women providing oocytes should be fair and not so substantial that they become
undue inducements that will lead donors to discount risks,” and analogized the egg-donation
process to the sperm-donation process [6]. A prior study had concluded that sperm donors earned
an hourly average of $60 to $75 in 2000 and estimated that egg donors spend 56 hours in a
medical setting per donation cycle [7]. If egg donors were paid the same hourly rate as sperm
donors, the ASRM report concluded, then a payment amount of $3,360 to $4,200 per eggdonation cycle would be reasonable.

According to ASRM, however, because egg donation involves a time commitment, risk, and
discomfort not associated with sperm donation, egg donors deserve higher amounts. The report
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concluded that “although there is no consensus on the precise payment that oocyte donors should
receive, at this time sums of $5000 or more require justification and sums above $10,000 go
beyond what is appropriate” [6]. In 2007, ASRM issued new guidelines that restated these
amounts and rationales [8]. The amounts have not been increased since ASRM adopted them
more than 10 years ago.

The Sherman Act Challenge
The Kamakahi complaint alleges that the ASRM-SART guidelines, as a naked pricefixing
agreement, are a per se violation of the Sherman Act, meaning that the guidelines are so
injurious to the public that they should be conclusively presumed illegal without inquiry into
whether competition is actually reduced or consumers are actually harmed. Agreements among
competitors to fix prices have long been considered per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, due to their perceived negative effects on competition [9]. This is true of both agreements to
fix output prices at some maximum (sellers’ cartel agreements) and agreements to fix input
prices at some minimum (buyers’ cartel agreements, such as the ASRM-SART guidelines).
Classifying an agreement as a per se violation dispenses with the need to inquire into market
structure, the market power of the violators, or the anticompetitive effects of the behavior. Under
a per se analysis, therefore, the ASRM guidelines would be conclusively presumed illegal [9].
The court’s denial of ASRM’s motion to dismiss Kamakahi’s per se claim, therefore, is a
substantial preliminary victory for the plaintiffs.

Kamakahi also contends that the guidelines violate the Sherman Act under a rule-of-reason
analysis, which Courts sometimes apply to alleged anticompetitive behavior by nonprofit or
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professional associations when the same conduct would be considered per se illegal if carried out
by business organizations. Such judicial deference is not explicitly a product of the
organizational form or nonprofit status of the defendants, but rather of a perception that, in many
such cases, the anticompetitive effects of the agreement or the intentions of the alleged violators
are not immediately discernable [10]. However, the negative economic impacts of the ASRMSART guidelines are readily apparent and the claimed procompetitive benefits are highly
contestable. As a result, the ASRM Guidelines are problematic even under a rule of reason
analysis.

Effects and Purposes of the ASRM Guidelines
ASRM defends the guidelines as a means of keeping the price of fertility services low, thus
benefiting fertility treatment patients [11]. But the guidelines plainly produce the same risks of
anticompetitive effects present in any other collusive buyers’ agreement: product scarcity, which
deprives fertility treatment patients of the full range and number of oocytes that would be
available to them in a free market. This scarcity drives up the price consumers are willing to pay
for the bundle of goods and services that will result in the creation of an embryo for
implantation. Because the price of a necessary input—the oocyte—has been capped, however,
the excess that consumers are willing to pay (termed “rents” by economists) can be captured by
the providers of fertility services [12]. Consumers are thus typically harmed, not helped, by
successful price-fixing agreements, including the ASRM-SART guidelines, to the extent the
agreements are effective.

ASRM asserts procompetitive justifications in defense of the guidelines, contending, for
example, that they protect the health and safety of both egg donors and recipients undergoing
assisted reproduction, by encouraging donors to honestly disclose medical and social histories—
a goal that would be undermined by high payments. In addition, the defense argues that eggdonor compensation rates dictated by the marketplace, rather than by the guidelines, risk the
exploitation and undue inducement of egg donors and may commodify human life and particular
genetic traits. These alleged effects of the guidelines are procompetitive because enhancing the
safety and social acceptability of the egg donation process may encourage women to donate eggs
and help promote the view among those affected by infertility that the use of donated oocytes is a
safe and responsible treatment, thus improving the market [11].

Assuming that safety, coercion, and commodification concerns could, in the absence of the
guidelines, undermine the market for fertility services and further assuming that it is possible to
structure financial incentives to egg donors in a manner that alleviates those concerns while
compensating oocyte donors for the time, effort, and health risks associated with the procedure
(as opposed to banning payments to oocyte donors altogether), there is no evidence that the
ASRM-SART guidelines strike that balance. In fact, there is no indication that ASRM even
considered such factors when setting standards for egg donor compensation. As previously
discussed, ASRM used sperm donation as a benchmark, and then stated that the additional time,
risk, and discomfort experienced by egg donors justified an additional payment up to $5,000 and
no more—without explaining where that amount came from, why it might represent a reasonable
compensation for the additional burdens that the committee agreed egg donors faced, or how this

limit addressed the safety, coercion, and commodification risks that the committee contended the
free market poses.

Moreover, the ability of any payment to coerce or induce action depends on the recipient’s
financial need. Accordingly, egg-donor compensation caps without reference to the potential
donor’s economic status do not effectively address financial coercion and undue inducement
concerns. Ironically, the most likely effect of the guidelines is to drive from the market those
donors with the highest opportunity costs, who tend to be better educated and of a higher
socioeconomic status. These donors are arguably in a better position to evaluate the risks of egg
donation against the monetary benefits, rendering them less susceptible to any “coercive” effects
of monetary compensation, because they are more likely to have other income opportunities from
which to choose.

In addition, there may be less draconian safeguards that could address many of these concerns
more effectively and without the accompanying anticompetitive effects. For example, mandating
egg-donor advocates, egg-donor screening, and other measures might promote the informed and
voluntary nature of each donation and eliminate donors who appear financially needy or who
have not carefully weighed the risks of donation. Similarly, the guidelines’ existing prohibitions
on compensation linked to particular donor traits, such as race, ethnicity, or intelligence
measures, might guard against some eugenics and commodification effects, though recent
research suggests this guidance is widely ignored [13].

Finally, some commenters have put forward a particularly odd defense of the guidelines -- that
the egg-donor compensation caps are unenforced and ineffective. [14, 15]. This contention raises
the question: if the compensation guidelines are not successfully controlling oocyte donor
compensation, then why do they exist? What possible purpose might be served by ineffective
and unenforced egg-donor compensation caps?

The most likely possibility is a desire to avoid industry controversy, including controversy
related to oocyte-donor compensation. Negative public attitudes toward fertility treatments
threaten to prompt into action state and federal lawmakers who, to date, have been largely
willing to rely on industry self-regulation of fertility services. It is thus possible that industry
attempts to control egg-donor compensation are prompted by a desire to forestall government
intervention, either by attempting to address perceived problems (albeit without success) or by
providing the appearance of addressing such problems.

ASRM thus faces a dilemma. To acknowledge that the guidelines are ineffective is to concede
that they fail to further the alleged safety, anticoercion, and anticommodification goals that form
the ASRM defense and also to concede that industry self-regulation has failed. To defend the
effectiveness of the guidelines is to concede that they reduce egg-donor compensation below the
levels that would operate in a market free of such restraints, thus assisting the plaintiffs’ case.

Conclusion
Kamakahi v. ASRM is still in the early stages of litigation, and both the plaintiffs and defendants
have hurdles to overcome before a decision is reached on the merits of the case. For example, the

court will need to evaluate the procompetitive arguments raised by the defense and, should the
court decide to proceed under a rule of reason analysis, the plaintiffs will need to prove elements
such as the market power of the defendants and the anticompetitive effects of the guidelines that
would be presumed under a per se analysis. But the suit is an important one that could signal a
change in public attitudes about the propriety of mixing money with motherhood. It should—and
will—be closely watched.

References
1. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, United States District
Court, Northern District of Ca., Class Action Complaint, Case No. 3:11-CV-1781 (filed
April 12, 2011).
2. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, United States District
Court, Northern District of Ca., Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Case No. 3:11-CV1781 (filed March 29, 2013).
3. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006).
4. The Market in Human Eggs: Underpaid Ovaries, The Economist (April 20, 2011).
5. Lawsuit Alleges Price Fixing on Egg Donation, Fertility Authority (quoting ASRM
Director of Public Affairs Sean Tipton as saying, “This lawsuit is frivolous, and we fully
expect the court will treat it as such.”) http://www.fertilityauthority.com/articles/lawsuitalleges-price-fixing-egg-donation. Accessed November 6, 2013.
6. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Incentives in Recruitment of
Oocyte Donors, 74 Fertility & Sterility 216, 216 (2000).
7. Machelle M. Seibel & Ann Kiessling, Compensating Egg Donors: Equal Pay for Equal
Time?, 328 New Engl. J. Med. 737 (1993).
8. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oocyte
Donors, 88 Fertility & Sterility 305, 308 (2007).
9. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 US 679, 692 (1978).
10. Arizona. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 US 332, 342–57 (1982); Goldfarb v. Va.
State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975).
11. Lindsay Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, United States District
Court, Northern District of Ca., Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
Amended Class Action Complaint, Case No. 3:11-CV-1781, p.16 (filed July 15, 2011).
12. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in The Gamete
Market, 72 L. & Contemp. Prbs. 59 (2009); Alex Tabarrok, The Oocyte Cartel, Marginal
Revolution (June 17, 2013).
13. Aaron D. Levine, Self-Regulation, Compensation, and the Ethical Recruitment of Oocyte
Donors, Hastings Center Report, 25-36 (March-April, 2010).
14. Pete Shanks, Trust-Busting in The Baby Business? Biopolitical Times (May 5, 2011);

15. Andrew Vorzimer, A Law Professor Comments On the Egg Donor Class Action
Lawsuit, The Spin Doctor (April 19, 2011).
Kimberly D. Krawiec, JD, is the Kathrine Robinson Everett Professor of Law and a Senior
Fellow at the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University, Durham, NC.

